Who Was Lord Haldane?

Lord Haldane

Richard Burdon Haldane (1856–1928) was a brilliant Scottish lawyer, philosopher, and politician who led the reform of the Britain's pre-WWI army.  His work made the deployment of the 1914 British Expeditionary Force feasible. He is best remembered, though, for the disappointing Haldane Mission, a diplomatic visit to Berlin he undertook as British secretary of state for war.  During the mission, which lasted from 8 to 11 February 1912, British ruling circles sought to explore possibilities for a British-German agreement that would recognize British naval superiority. If Germany would cease to compete with Britain in building up naval armaments, the British government was prepared to satisfy some of Germany's colonial demands in Africa. 

The Germans sought to conclude a separate British-German agreement pledging each side to neutrality should the other find itself involved in a war; such an agreement would have amounted to Great Britain's withdrawal from the Entente. 

Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg

No agreement was reached, however. Lord Haldane's negotiations with the German imperial chancellor, Theobold von Bethmann-Hollweg, underlined the profound differences between Great Britain and Germany and actually led to an intensification of their naval rivalry. 

After his service as war minister, Haldane became Lord Chancellor but was hounded out of office by the press unjustly for supposed German sympathies. In the 1920s he moved to the Labor Party and returned to office as Lord Chancellor in the cabinet of Ramsay MacDonald. He is remembered for drafting the legislation making London University possible.

On Haldane’s death the Times described him as “one of the most powerful, subtle and encyclopaedic intellects ever devoted to the public service of his country.”

From the Free Dictionary and Who's Who in WWI

Comparing the Costs of the World Wars

A Cold War Euphemism for These Was "Expendables"

I found this interesting table below in a 2002 paper titled  "THE ECONOMICS OF WORLD WAR I: AN OVERVIEW" by Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison of University of Warwick, Coventry. I can't vouch for the precision of the statistics (I think they made a mistake on the number of continents for WWI), but it does show in broad scope some of the similarities and differences in the two world wars. 

The Dynamic Qualities of First World War Avant-garde Art

I make no claims to being an art critic, and I generally loathe modern art, but to my eye, it is clear that the avant-garde artists of the First World War captured some of its essence. Most clear is the dynamism of many of their paintings. Here's a selection pieces from the pre- to postwar years.

Ludwig Meidner,
"Apocalyptic Landscape," 1913

Man Ray,
"A.D. 1914," 1914

Marsden Hartley
"Painting Nr. 5," 1914–1915

Ernst Ludwig Kirchner
"Self-Portrait as a Soldier," 1915

Gino Severini
"Cannon in Action," 1915

Pierre Albert-Birot
"The War,"1916

Gert Heinrich Wollheim
"The Wounded Person," 1919

The Curator at Madrid's Museo Thyssen-Bornemisza 2008 show "The Avant-Garde and the Great War" made these comments for the catalog:

The period inmediately prior to the outbreak of war in 1914 coincided with a highpoint of activity among the avant-garde movements. In addition, the experience of World War I exercised a powerful influence on the work of numerous artist during this period from the main artistic movements of the day — Expressionism, Cubism, Futurism, Vorticism, Abstraction, etc. Often the works are prophetic or apocalyptic.

German Artillery, 1914–1918 reviewed by Terrence Finnegan

German Artillery, 1914–1918

by Wolfgang Fleischer

Pen & Sword Books Ltd., 2015

The depth of research over the years regarding the First World War has amazingly skirted a detailed examination of artillery, the most deadly of German weapons on the Western Front. However, Wolfgang Fleisher's German Artillery, 1914-1918, provides a refreshing look at the inventory of guns of the field artillery: Fussartillerie and heavy flat-trajectory guns; anti-aircraft guns; infantry, anti-tank and mountain guns; and coastal guns. The book is a handy guide with an excellent photo of each artillery piece, a chart showing each weapon's caliber, weight, rate of fire, maximum range of the shell fired and other data points for consideration. In some cases a diagram of the artillery shell fired by the artillery piece is included in the description.

German Artillery Piece, Arras Sector

The challenge for military history enthusiasts of the First World War when reading a guide such as German Artillery, 1914-1918, is that translation of the actual German terminology becomes the publisher's prerogative. When you research the actual files of transcribed German field orders and plans, you discover the weapon to be employed has a specific nomenclature assigned. Sadly, confusion occurs when reading primary source documents. A case in point is Fleischer's listing of 7.7-cm Field Gun 96 n/A compared to the actual 7.7cm Feldkanone 96 n/A. (F.K. 96 n/A) title in German orders. English translations of the weapon's nomenclature should be in parentheses. The document below shows actual text from a German report on artillery rounds fired during an operation. Note the nomenclature for the artillery pieces.

What is missing from Fleischer's work is any mention of Minenwerfer (mine launchers (MW)), the workhorse of many a German assault. Perhaps the argument is that MW were not classified as artillery. However, inclusion of these important weapons would have further enhanced the value of the book.

For those interested in seeing other sources on German Artillery, I also recommend Herbert Jäger's German Artillery of World War One and the German Army Handbook April 1918. They are both good reads.



Terrence Finnegan

100 Years Ago: The Canadians Recapture Mont Sorrel, Ypres Salient

Canadian Troops in a Reserve Trench  Before the Action

The Battlefield

About three miles east of Ypres there is a series of nubs (generously refered to as Mont Sorrel) running south from Hooge on the Menin Road and just east of famous Sanctuary Wood for a little over a mile. The three nubs are known as Tor Top or Hill 62, Hill 61, and the highest, Mont Sorrel.   Despite my quibbles about their designation, as the photo below – taken from the monument on Hill 62 looking toward Ypres – shows, the position commands the countryside around it.

One hundred years ago the Canadian Corps was in control of the this property, with its 3rd Division defending the area between Hooge and Mont Sorrel proper. The neighboring German army decided it wanted to assume ownership of the land with its excellent views of the Ypres Salient.

View Toward Ypres from Hill 62 (Forget About the Trees)

German Bombardment and Mining

The 3rd Canadian Division, which had been formed in December 1915, was the target of a crushing German bombardment on the morning of 2 June. The barrage devastated the forward Canadian positions and killed hundreds, including the division commander, Major-General Malcolm Mercer. German infantry then swept forward, capturing Canadian positions at Mount Sorrel and on two surrounding hills. A hastily organized counterattack on 3 June failed. Three days later, the Germans exploded four mines under the Canadian positions and captured the village of Hooge.

Canadian Troops Advancing on 13 June 1916

Success After Initial Losses

The Canadian Corps commander, Sir Julian Byng, was determined to retake the lost ground and attacked, after a heavy artillery bombardment, during the early hours of 13 June. In this major set-piece battle, the Canadians drove back the Germans and recaptured much of the lost ground.

Final Line Shown in Blue

The Battle of Mont Sorrel lasted for almost two weeks and cost the Canadians over 8,000 casualties. Having lost the first two phases of the battle, the Canadians achieved victory in the final operation. Careful planning and concentrated artillery bombardments had begun to tip the balance on the First World War battlefields in favor of attackers over entrenched defenders.

Sources: Canadian War Museum Website, Regina Rifles Regimental History

100 Years Ago: The Incident of the Tranchée des Baionnettes

At the Tranchée des Baionnettes (aka the Bayonet Trench) history intermingles with legend. On 12 June 1916, this entrenched position – part of a bigger trench complex known as the "Checkerboard" was a part of the terrain forming a salient on the upper slope of a gully known aptly as the "Ravine of Death" southwest of Fort Douaumont. The Germans wanted to secure the area before launching their renewed offensive in the Verdun "Hot Zone." 

The Original Trench of 3rd Company, 137th Infantry

Two battalions of the 137th Infantry Regiment, deployed at the front since 10 June, were the object of appalling shelling and very soon found themselves cut off. The regiment's 3rd Company had lost 94 of its 164 men by the night of the 11th. The remainder had been placed in row of exposed trenches directly observable by German artillery spotters. The artillery fire on the position increased in the early morning hours, and the remainder of 137th Regiment was annihilated almost to a man.  

Author Alistair Horne tells what subsequently transpired.

It was not until after the war that French teams exploring the battlefield provided a clue as to the fate of 3 Company. The trench it had occupied was discovered completely filled in, but from a part of it at regular intervals protruded rifles, with bayonets still fixed to their twisted and rusty muzzles, On excavation, a corpse was found beneath each rifle. From that plus the testimony of survivors from nearby units, it was deduced that 3 Company had placed its rifles on the parapet ready to repel any attack and — rather than abandon their trench — had been buried alive to a man there by the German bombardment. When the story of the Tranchée des Baionnettes was told it caught the world's imagination.

The Colonel's Original Marker

The Present Monument Alone on the Devastated Battlefield
Sometime After December 1920

Colonel De Bonnefoy, Commander of the 137th, had a small wooden monument erected there in January 1919. A generous American patron, Mr. G.F. Rand, funded the present-day trench covering with a paved path ending at the nearest road. This monument was opened by Alexandre Millerand, president of the Republic, in the presence of the ambassador of the United States, on 8 December 1920. 

Entrance

Massive Canopy Over the Trench

The Trench Today:
The Bayonets Have All Disappeared Over the Years

It was the earliest major monument at Verdun and became the "must see" site of the battlefield up to the Second World War. Other theories have evolved over the years about the fate of the last men of the 3rd Company. Gas or concussion from exploding shells are alternative explanations of the mass deaths of the men. This may have been followed by Germans overrunning the position and hurriedly filling in the mass grave, which would explain their unique interment, but the exact details are beside the point. 

As Horne points out, the legend persists because whatever happened was an epic display of gallantry and sacrifice by the Poilus and a vivid documentation of the intensity of the fighting at Verdun. The Tranchée des Baionnettes symbolizes what makes Verdun a singular event in military history.

The Horne quote is from his book The Price of Glory.

Remember the Titanic's Rescue Ship RMS Carpathia?

The Titanic's rescue ship RMS Carpathia has some interesting connections to the Great War.

RMS Carpathia

Captain Arthur Rostron of the Carpathia during the Titanic rescue, and later captained the Lusitania. As an officer in the Royal Naval Reserve, when war broke out he was called to service and commanded the troopship Aulania at Gallipoli. He subsequently commanded a number of naval transports.

The Legendary "Unsinkable Molly Brown" Presenting
an Appreciation Cup for the Rescue

Sadly, Carpathia was lost in service during the war. On 15 July 1918, Carpathia departed Liverpool in a convoy bound for Boston. On the summer morning of 17 July she was torpedoed, at 9:15, in the Celtic Sea by the German submarine U-55. Of the two torpedoes initially fired at the ship, one hit the port side while the other penetrated the engine room, killing two firemen and three trimmers. As Carpathia began to settle by the head and list to port, Captain William Prothero gave the order to abandon ship. All 57 passengers (36 saloon class and 21 steerage) and 218 surviving crew members boarded the lifeboats as the vessel sank.  

RMS Carpathia Goes Under, 17 July 1918

U-55 surfaced and fired a third torpedo into the ship and was approaching the lifeboats when the Azalea-class sloop HMS Snowdrop arrived on the scene and drove away the submarine with gunfire before picking up the survivors from Carpathia. America's Last Doughboy, Frank Buckles, had sailed for England on an earlier voyage of the Carpathia.

Images of California at War, 1917–1918

Guarding the Golden Gate
Disappearing 12-inch Gun, Ft. Winfield Scott, Presidio

Blouse of 91st Wild West Division Veteran

117th Engineers, 42nd Rainbow Division in France
(The Regiment Included the 1st California Engineers)

40th Division Recruit Cutting Onions
During K.P. at Camp Kearney, CA

Flight Line, Naval Air Station, San Diego

1 January 1918

Future U.S. Chief Justice Earl Warren
363rd Infantry, 91st Division

Sleeping Arrangements to Prevent Influenza
Yerba Buena Naval Station, San Francisco Bay

Market Street, San Francisco, at the Time of the Armistice

Found at the California Military History Facebook Page:  (Link)

Recommended: The Long Arm of Otto von Bismarck

Recently, I discovered that an apparently inactive site called THE CORNER (not the site of the same name by National Review magazine) has what is simply the clearest summary I've seen of the alliance system that developed after the Franco-Prussian War.  At the center of the juggling act is, of course, German chancellor Otto von Bismarck. Here is the opening section that covers the "marriage" of the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires, an important and maybe critical factor in European politics right up to the July Crisis of 1914:

The League of the Three Emperors (1872)

Bismarck's aim for forming this league was to isolate France by making friends with Austria and Russia. The partners were Kaiser William I of Germany, Tsar Alexander II of Russia, and Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria. These three rulers agreed: (i) to maintain the existing territorial arrangements in Europe; (ii) to resist the spread of revolutionary (e.g. socialist) movements; and (iii) to consult one another if any international difficulties arose.

France was being diplomatically isolated, but the underlying weakness of this personal understanding between the three emperors was the rivalry between Austria and Russia over the Balkan Peninsula. Both sought to dominate the Balkans. It was difficult for Bismarck to keep them in the same camp.

Dual Alliance 1879

The Congress of Berlin 1878

Rivalry between Austria and Russia in the Balkans came to a head in 1877–78. In 1875, five Balkan states revolted against Turkish rule. Russia supported the Balkan states and defeated Turkey. On 8 March 1878, Turkey was forced to sign the Treaty of San Stefano, in which an independent, big Bulgaria was created. Seeing that this Bulgaria would be a Russian puppet, Austria intervened, backed up by Britain, the traditional rival of Russia in the eastern Mediterranean. Bismarck volunteered to act as an "honest broker" and called the Congress of Berlin to settle the Balkan problems. At this Congress, Germany sided with Austria and Britain. Russia had to give up the Treaty of San Stefano and sign the Treaty of Berlin. The Treaty split Bulgaria into three parts (Bulgaria proper was to be independent, Eastern Rumelia and Macedonia were to be ruled under Turkish sovereignty.) and brought Bosnia and Herzegovina under Austrian military occupation (but not annexation). Russia felt diplomatically humiliated. The anger of Russia turned against Bismarck because he chaired the Congress.

Germany sided with Austria

Unable to maintain friendly relations with both Austria and Russia, Bismarck chose Austria to be his ally because, first, Germany preferred a weaker partner that could be more easily controlled; second, alliance with Austria would throw open the Danube valley to German trade; third, Austria had ethnic ties with Germany; fourth, such an alliance would enable Germany to exercise influence in the Balkans; and fifth, alliance with Russia would antagonize Britain, since Britain did not like her colonial rival to be supported by a strong power.

The terms of the Dual Alliance

On 7 October 1879 Bismarck made the Dual Alliance with Austria-Hungary. The terms were: (i) each would support the other militarily until the end of the war if attacked by Russia or by Russia and another power; and (ii) each agreed to remain neutral if her ally was attacked by a power other than Russia.

Consequence

The Dual Alliance gave Germany a firm military ally but committed her more to the support of Austrian interests in the Balkans. In the meantime, however, Bismarck still wanted to keep the friendship of Russia for fear that Russia would turn to the side of France, in which case Germany would face an enemy on both east and west. 

Tsar Alexander III (r. 1881–1894)

The Second Three Emperors' League (1881)

Bismarck still wanted to keep Russian friendship after the signing of Dual Alliance (1879) with Austria. The year 1881 was particularly favorable for the restoration of the league of the three conservative emperors. In that year, Tsar Alexander III ascended the Russian throne after the assassination of Alexander II. The fate of his father made Alexander III ready for a renewal of the Three Emperors' League of 1872, which promised to suppress the revolutionary movements.

The terms of the league were: ( i ) the Balkans was to be divided into two spheres of influence — the western Balkans (Bosnia and Herzegovina) belonged to Austria and the eastern Balkans (Bulgaria) belonged to Russia; (ii) the three emperors agreed to consult one another if there was another Balkan crisis, and (iii) the three emperors agreed to preserve benevolent neutrality if any one of them found himself at war with a fourth power. The league could not last long because Austria and Russia would soon rival over the Balkan Peninsula again.

Read the Full Article at:

http://www.funfront.net/hist/wwi/alliance.htm

100 Years Ago: Fort Vaux Falls

German Troops Atop Fort Vaux, June 1916

Yesterday was a big anniversary for the Battle of Verdun. On 7 June 1916 Fort Vaux – IMHO one of the two most valuable fortifications for the French Army during the great battle – finally fell to the German Army.

Outside the Fort Today

After mighty Fort Douaumont had fallen primarily through negligence on the fifth day of the struggle, Vaux, the smallest of the Verdun Forts, held out for three and a half months stopping cold the left flank of the enemy's offensive.  It beat back two major efforts to capture it in April and May. By June, however, the French infantry had been driven from all the supporting positions and – due to the steep slopes north and east of the fort – German assault troops were able to approach the fort blind to the artillery protecting Fort Vaux.

Atop the Fort Looking Northwest and Over the Main Defensive Ditch

Nonetheless, it took the four battalions committed to the attack a week to fulfill their mission, taking over 2,700 casualties. Despite getting inside the fort through a weak spot at the latrines and getting into its passageways, where war was waged with gas, flamethrower, and grenade, the immediate cause of the surrender was the lack of water for the defenders.

Inside the Fort at a Calmer Moment

Fort Vaux's loss was a morale blow for the French, and it allowed the Germans to proceed with their advance on the next major obstacle on their left, Fort Souville.

Atop the Fort Looking West to the Woevre Plain, Occupied Entirely by German Forces

The siege of Fort Vaux, however, provided a notable addition to France's pantheon of war heroes. Major Sylvain Eugène Raynal was already twice wounded in the war when he volunteered for a command position in the Verdun fortress zone.  Arriving at Fort Vaux on 21 May 1916, he proved an industrious and inspiring leader for his  troops.  When he surrendered he informed his captors that it was only thirst that had defeated his troops. The Crown Prince later personally congratulated him on his leadership of the defense of the fort.

Major Raynal and an Aide in Custody after the Surrender

Thanks to regular contributor Steve Miller and several of my traveling mates for the photos here

Betrayal at Little Gibraltar reviewed by Peter Belmonte

Betrayal at Little Gibraltar: A German Fortress, a Treacherous American General, and the Battle to End World War I

by William Walker

Scribner, 2016

Most students of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive know that General John Pershing's objective for the first day's advance, some nine miles in the case of the center V Corps commanded by General George H. Cameron, was wildly optimistic. Cameron's right flank division, the inexperienced and undertrained 79th Division, was slated to advance against the heavily fortified Montfaucon, the most difficult assignment given to any division for that day. In the event, the 79th could not take Montfaucon the first day, and it was terribly bloodied in the attempt. Most historians have attributed this failure to the division's lack of training, inexperienced officers and staff, and the American Expeditionary Forces' (AEF) faulty tactics. But perhaps more was at play.

Montfaucon – First Day Objective of the 79th Division

A chance discovery of marginalia and notes written long ago in an old book housed on a dusty library shelf propelled author William Walker on a two-decade quest to uncover the truth behind a shocking accusation. The notes, written in the 1930s by Major Harry Parkin, commander of the 1st Battalion, 316th Infantry Regiment, 79th Division, during the battle, blamed the 79th Division's failure on deliberate misinterpretation and disobedience of orders by III Corps commander, General Robert L. Bullard. The accusation, and Walker's thesis, is that Bullard ignored orders to have his left flank division, the veteran 4th, conduct a flanking movement to its left to assist the 79th Division in taking Montfaucon. This, according to Walker, amounted to nothing short of murder. This book seeks to prove his strong assertion.

General Robert Bullard

Walker's opening chapters summarize neatly the course of the war up to 1918 and the events that directly served to push the US into the war. Part I of the book, 126 pages, is devoted to setting the stage prior to the first shots of the battle. Part II is devoted to the action of the 79th Division from the start of the campaign until the end of the war. It is, basically, a combat history of the division. For this, Walker uses unit histories and memoirs, both published and unpublished, to paint a vivid picture of the 79th Division's struggle. I have studied and written about the Meuse-Argonne Offensive; the grueling ordeal and casualties recorded in Part II did not surprise me. What never ceases to surprise me, however, is that men were willing to carry on under such terrible conditions.

Central to Walker's claim is the First Army attack order, part of which is quoted in the book and is admittedly open to interpretation. The order directed III Corps to cooperate with V Corps to its left by "turn[ing] Montfaucon and the section of the hostile second position within the zone of action of the V Corps, thereby assisting in the capture of the hostile second position west of Montfaucon [p. 64]." In other words, III Corps was ordered to use its left flank division (the 4th) to attack Montfaucon from the flank and rear in V Corps zone. This would also allow an envelopment from the opposite flank by the V Corps center division (the 37th), and finally permit the taking of Montfaucon by the 79th Division. Bullard's final III Corps order, however, fails to mention or allow this flanking operation.

Part III is the meat of the book regarding the author's thesis. Here Walker discusses the evidence that shows Bullard's intentional disobedience of orders, despite the original First Army attack order, and despite a request from General John Hines, commander of the 4th Division, to go to the aid of the neighboring 79th Division late on 26 September. In Part III, the author presents and weighs the evidence, including Major Parkin's detailed memoir and an extensive postwar report written by General Ewing Booth. Booth, a brigade commander in the 4th Division, had proposed that during the first day of the attack he move upon Montfaucon from the flank, basically in accordance with original Army orders. Although his division commander, Hines, initially approved the action, the decision was countermanded before it could be put into effect.

Order Now

After the war, Booth spent twenty years researching the cause of this action, which he felt warranted censure on someone's part. In addition, Walker examines statements by General Alfred Bjornstad, 4th Division chief of staff. According to the author, Bullard intentionally disobeyed the original First Army order, and here Walker outlines his evidence and tells us much more about these men and their proclivities. In the end, the reader will decide for himself whether Walker's facts, as put forth here, justify his conclusions.

Bullard was abrasive and hard driving, and he held mid-19th-century racial views, but during the war and afterward his faults were overlooked in favor of his units' results. Walker's work, however, serves to place a blemish, at the very least, on Bullard's reputation. I am, by nature, skeptical of such sensational, if not revisionist, claims as Walker puts forth, and although there can be differing interpretations of the evidence that Walker has presented, I am convinced that he has come to the correct conclusions. This is one of the best new AEF books I've read. I highly recommend it.

Peter Belmonte

Battlefield Recon: The Mines of Messines

Gentlemen, we may not make history tomorrow, but we shall certainly change the geography.

Attributed to General Hubert Plumer, 6 June 1917

The Battle of Messines, which opened 99 years ago tomorrow on 7 June 1917 with the explosion of 19 mines over a ten-mile long sector of the front, was the successful and historic prelude to the otherwise disastrous Passchendaele campaign. The story of the battle is told in many sources. We reflect here, instead, on the second part of  the comment quoted above, which was made the night before the battle. The mines, indubitably, changed the local geography. The enormous explosions created lasting eyesores, fishing ponds, habitats, and some beautiful naturalistic war memorials. Here are five examples.

Hill 60A Mine

The northern-most mine was blown under the grim battlefield of Hill 60, a man-made elevation constructed with the debris from the construction of an adjacent railroad cut. The hill remains perturbed and irregular with gross war wounds and, today, is so rugged-looking and overgrown that we could not find a current-day photo clearly delineating the 1917 crater, which lies close to the rail line. The post-explosion image above is from the Australian War Memorial archives. To visualize now, imagine grass and 90(plus)-year-old trees overlaying this scene. The mine was dug by an Australian company, whose story is told in the recent movie Hill 60. This mine and 60B below were the subject of the excellent Australian film Beneath Hill 60.

Caterpillar Mine, AKA Hill 60B Mine

On the opposite side of the railroad cut lies a second, rather elongated artificial hill, known as the "Caterpillar" from the shape of its contours on trench maps, which was created from the same kind of remnants as Hill 60. It was the location one of the most "successful" mines of the operation, over 600 German soldiers perished here. However, unlike the crater on Hill 60, which is drained by the web of tunnels under the hill, this site retains rainwater and so the 100-foot-wide and 60-foot-deep crater fills, rising and falling with the rainfall. Off the beaten track yet accessible, it is a lovely and somber destination for Western Front explorers.

Spanbroekmolen Mine

Further south, near the village of Messines, is the Spanbroekmolen Mine Crater, also known as Lone Tree Crater, site one of the largest of the 7 June mines. This water-filled crater was purchased by Lord Wakefield in the 1920s to be preserved as a memorial site on the Ypres Salient battlefields. The mine crater has subsequently been named the "Pool of Peace" and is today the property of Toc H (the Talbot House) in Poperinghe.

Kruisstraat Mine #2

This is one of three mines immediately south of Spanbroekmolen. Created by over 40 tons of explosives, it was sited at the end of a 700m tunnel, well into the German lines in the path of the attacking 36th (Ulster) Division. It is said to be a popular fishing hole today.

Trench 122 Mine

One of the four southern-most mines all dug by the Canadian 3rd Tunneling Company. It is on private land just north of "Plug Street" wood and close, as well, to one of the major sites of the 1914 Christmas Truce.