The Durnovo Memorandum was possibly the most prescient political analysis in history. It was penned by Pyotr N. Durnovo, a member of the State Council and former minister of the interior in Witte's cabinet, and presented to the Tsar on 14 February 1914. A conservative monarchist and Russian nationalist, Durnovo thought war between Germany and Great Britain was certain, and he emphasized that it was not in Russia's interest to fight in such a costly and uncertain war against its fellow monarchy Germany. He thought the outcome of such a war would only further British interests and that rapprochement with Germany was a more prudent course. The specificity of his forecasting is remarkable. Here are some of his most significant "hits":
- The fundamental groupings in a future war are self-evident: Russia, France, and England, on the one side, with Germany, Austria, and Turkey, on the other...[Romania] will remain neutral until the scales of fortune favor one or another side.
|Pyotr N. Durnovo
- Indeed, it is possible that America or Japan may join the anti-German side. [Both did, of course.]
- We must note, first of all, the insufficiency of our [Russia's] war supplies.
- But in the event of defeat, the possibility of which in a struggle with a foe like Germany cannot be overlooked, social revolution in its most extreme form is inevitable...the trouble will start with the blaming of the Government for all disasters. In the legislative institutions a bitter campaign against the Government will begin, followed by revolutionary agitations throughout the country, with Socialist slogans, capable of arousing and rallying the masses, beginning with the division of the land and succeeded by a division of all valuables and property. The defeated army, having lost its most dependable men, and carried away by the tide of primitive peasant desire for land, will find itself too demoralized to serve as a bulwark of law and order.
- Germany, likewise, is destined to suffer, in case of defeat, no lesser social upheavals. The effect of a disastrous war upon the population will be too severe not to bring to the surface destructive tendencies, now deeply hidden.
Apparently, however, the memorandum had no impact on the decision making of the Tsar and his advisers six months later during the July Crisis. Durnovo died in 1915 before most of his predictions were validated.